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This paper shows how political parties diﬀerentiate to reduce electoral competi-
tion. Two parties choose platforms in a unidimensional policy space, and then in a
continuum of constituencies with diﬀerent median voters candidates from the two
parties compete in Hotelling-Downs competition. Departing from party platform
is costly enough that candidates do not take the median voter’s preferred position
in each constituency. In equilibrium, parties acting in their candidates’ best in-
terests diﬀerentiate–when one party locates right of center, the other prefers to
locate strictly left of center to carve out a “home turf,” consituencies that can be
won with little to no deviation from party platform. Hence, Downsian competi-
tion that pulls candidates together pushes parties apart. Decreasing “campaign
costs” increases party diﬀerentiation as the leftist party must move further from
the rightist party to carve out its home turf. For a range of costs, parties take
more extreme positions than their most extreme candidates. For small costs, par-
ties are too extreme to maximise voter welfare, whereas for large costs they are
not extreme enough.
Keywords Parties, median voter, Downsian competition.
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Competition among political parties is surprisingly lacklustre. Approximately one-sixth of
seats in the American House of Representatives go uncontested by one of the two major
parties–Democrats or Republicans–each electoral cycle. American political parties sys-
tematically lose elections in politically unfavorable constituencies: Republicans win in the
now-famous “red” states of the South, Mid-West, and South-West, while Democrats win in
the remaining “blue” states, primarily on the two coasts. Contrary to the claims of Naderites,
the two major parties diﬀer in signiﬁcant ways: virtually all Democrats in the Senate are less
conservative than virtually all Republicans.1 Why is political competition so uncompetitive?
This paper shows that rather than draw them together, political competition drives parties
apart. Perhaps the most famous result in formal political theory is that two candidates
competing in a ﬁrst-past-the-post election for political oﬃce should jointly adopt the median
voter’s preferred position (Hotelling 1929, Downs 1957, Black 1958). We use the Hotelling-
Downs model of electoral competition as our point of departure to explore party positioning.
What types of platforms do political parties acting in their candidates’ best interests espouse?
We show that parties separate precisely because symmetric candidates compete so vigorously.
They diﬀerentiate to reduce political competition.
We model a political party as a collection of candidates, each of whom campaigns in
a diﬀerent constituency. In each constituency, candidates from the two parties compete in
a ﬁrst-past-the-post election. Voters in every constituency have single-peaked preferences
in the same unidimensional policy space; diﬀerent constituencies have median voters with
diﬀerent ideal points. Knowing the distribution of median voters’ ideal points, the two political
parties choose where to place their platforms in policy space. A party’s platform serves
as its candidates’ default policy position. However, in any constituency, either candidate
may depart from her party’s position at a cost: the further she moves from her party, the
higher the candidate’s cost. Such costs could come about for any number of reasons, from
campaign advertising–informing voters of a position diﬀerent from your party’s requires
costly advertising–to career concerns–departing from party platform diminishes prospects
within the party, while toeing the party line becomes more costly the further away it lies. (For
1Excluding the Democratic Senator Miller of Georgia, and the Republican Senators Chafee or Rhode Island
and Snowe of Maine, all Democratic Senators had lower ADA scores in 2003 than all Republican Senators
(<www.adaction.org>). ADA scores are commonly used in the political-science literature to measure of
political orientation.
1expositional simplicity, we refer to these costs of departing from party platform as campaign
costs throughout.) Candidates trade campaign costs oﬀ against the private beneﬁt of winning
elections.
In this setting, we ask where political parties seeking to maximise their candidates’ payoﬀs
position their platforms. Our main result is that if campaign costs are high enough that can-
didates do not adopt the median voter’s preferred position in each constituency, then parties
do not jointly adopt the median voter’s median preferred position; they non-cooperatively
diﬀerentiate from each other. This happens because the closer the two parties’ positions, the
more intensely their candidates compete to win election in any given constituency. Conse-
quently, each party has incentive to move away from the other–giving up heavily contested
elections–in order to carve out politically sympathetic constituencies where it wins elections
without much costly repositioning. Thus, while competition may drive candidates together,
it drives parties apart.
In addition to providing their candidates with funds and organisational infrastructure,
political parties also signal their candidates’ policy positions. While candidates deviate from
party policy to cater to their constituents–Republicans in Maryland espouse more liberal
positions than their colleagues in Virginia–they clearly do not go so far as to adopt the median
voter’s preferred position. Parties systemativally lose elections in poltically unfavourable
constituencies. Simple evidence for this comes from the correlation in American Senators’
political aﬃliation. If voters elected candidates based upon their policy positions (or anything
uncorrelated with party), and candidates took the median voter’s position in every state,
then given that roughly half of Senators come from each major party, the correlation in
party aﬃliation between the junior and senior Senators across the ﬁfty states would be zero:
knowing a state’s senior Senator’s party aﬃliation would provide no information about the
junior Senator’s. The fact that the current correlation is 0.50 provides strong evidence that
certain states favor candidates from one political party over the other.2 This partisanship
may derive from voters’ having inherent preferences for candidates from one party over those
from the other (begging the question of why parties enjoy such advantages in the ﬁrst place)
or because candidates depart from the median voter’s position in systematic ways. The
2We exclude Vermont from the correlation as Senator Jeﬀords belongs to neither party. Of the remaining
98 Senators, 47 are Democrats and 51 Republican. The null hypothesis that their parties are uncorrelated
can be formally tested through a chi-squared test that Senators’ party aﬃliations are independent draws. The
chi-squared statistic with one degree of freedom is 598.3, rejecting the null hypothesis at any conventional
signiﬁcance level.
2closer a candidate’s party lies to the median voter’s preferred policy, the closer the candidate
positions to the median voter; consequently, the candidate whose party platform lies closer to
the median voter wins the election with higher probability. We favor the latter interpretation,
which we capture in a simple way: candidates pay campaign costs to deviate from their party
platform.
In our model, the candidate whose party platform lies closer to the median voter has an
advantage in the election and is more likely to win. In some constituencies (paramaterised
by their diﬀerent median voters) both candidates toe the party line, and the advantaged
candidate wins the election with probability one. In others, candidates mix over policy
positions; no candidate would undertake a costly departure from party platform only to
lose the election with probability one. In these constituencies, the advantaged candidate
sometimes loses but always wins with higher likelihood than the disadvantaged candidate.
More importantly, by increasing her advantage, a candidate can decrease the campaign costs
needed to win the election with any given probability. As the Republican party moves to the
right, Republican candidates in states more conservative than their party need to depart less
from party platform to fend oﬀ Democratic challengers.
When moving away from centre (the median voter’s median position) parties acting in
their candidates’ best interests trade the expected number of elections their candidates win
oﬀ against the costs their candidates pay to win those elections. Moving to the right costs the
Republican party elections in the centre but also carves out a home turf on the right where
elections can be won at little or no cost. Because elections in the centre are heavily contested
by the Democrats, they can only be won at considerable cost.3 Each party’s incentive to win
any particular constituency depends not upon the value of election alone but rather upon its
value net of campaign costs.
When campaign costs are high–candidates only reluctantly deviate from party platform–
parties position themselves near the centre of the policy spectrum but suﬃciently far apart
that candidates from the leftist party do not contest elections in constituencies where the
median voter lies right of the rightist party, and vice versa. Candidates only ever depart
from their parties’ positions to move to the centre. Consequently, the leftist party’s position
lies (weakly) to the left of all leftist candidates’ positions, and likewise for the rightist party.
3Indeed, Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart (2001) ﬁnd the gap in candidates’ policy positions is smallest in
those Congressional districts whose voters split ﬁfty-ﬁfty in the vote for President: in contested consituencies,
candidates must depart from their party platforms.
3With high campaign costs, each party adopts a platform more extreme than its most extreme
candidate.
As the costs of campaigning decrease, parties initially move apart from each other. Know-
ing that candidates from the other party will compete more intensely for any given realisation
of the median voter, each party must move away from the other in order to carve out its home
turf. But once costs fall below some threshold, parties’ platforms jump back to the median
voter’s median position. This happens when campaign costs become suﬃciently low that
candidates adopt the median voter’s position in every constituency, in which case parties
minimise relocation costs by moving to the median voter’s median position.
Because candidates do not adopt the median voter’s preferred position in every con-
stituency, electoral competition does not maximise voter welfare.4 A natural question is
whether parties are too homogenous or too heterogenous for that purpose. Moving party
platforms apart has two eﬀects. When candidates retain their party platforms, separating
platforms increases candidate diversity, which tends to raise welfare. But it also softens
competition–candidates become less likely to take the median voter’s preferred position–
which tends to lower welfare. When campaigning is very costly, parties locate very near the
centre of the policy spectrum and only in constituencies with median voters in the centre
do candidates adopt the median voter’s preferred position. In this case–candidates nearly
always retain their party platforms–moving platforms apart increases voter welfare. On the
other hand, when campaigning costs little and candidates diﬀerentiate to a high degree, then
moving platforms together increases welfare by encouraging competition.
Candidates’ costs from deviating from party policy play a crucial role in our analysis. We
regard these costs as a reduced form of the many reasons why candidates may wish to mimic
their parties. Most literally, advertising or publicising a new policy may be costly (buying
television spots, etc.), doubly so as departing from party position may alienate donors. A can-
didate holding a position diﬀerent from her party’s may jeopardise leadership prospects. Or,
these costs also could represent unpalatable payments or promises to special interests neces-
sary to ﬁnance publicising a change from party policy. Political action committees–pressure
groups–provide forty percent of funding for American Congressional elections (Herrnson
1997). The formal model does not depend on whether parties or candidates pay these costs.
4Locating at the median voter’s position maximizes voter welfare when voters’ utility decreases in the
elected candidate’s absolute distance from their bliss point. We restrict attention to these preferences in our
welfare section but believe our qualitative results extend to other single-peaked preferences.
4For the results, what matters most is that the overall game not be zero sum: ﬁxing the number
of elections they win, parties prefer that their candidates adhere to the party platform.5
Strictly speaking, in our model candidates prefer not to belong to either party so as to be
able to adopt any position without cost. But for any number of reasons outside our formal
model candidates beneﬁt from party membership. Parties may reduce the costs of elections
by sharing ﬁxed costs across candidates. They may also enjoy legal privileges beneﬁting their
candidates: party candidates automatically appear on the ballot in many elections, whereas
unattached candidates often must submit petitions signed by enough voters. If elected, can-
didates who belong to a party enjoy more power through appointment to committees, etc.
Likewise, we ignore candidates’ party assignment. In our model, both candidates prefer to
belong to the party closer to their constituency’s median voter. Moreover, the candidate
belonging to the party further away receives zero expected utility. Yet if candidates enjoy
other beneﬁts from campaigning, and there are enough potential candidates, then neither
party will have trouble ﬁelding a candidate. We believe that we sacriﬁce little in realism or
applicability by assuming that for exogenous reasons the election in each constituency consists
of one candidate from each of two parties.6
Several authors have explored the role of parties in electoral competition. Austen-Smith
(1984) presents a model where in each of n constituencies, each of two parties ﬁelds a candidate
in a ﬁrst-past-the-post election. Voters recognise that government policy depends upon which
party wins and where their party lies. Candidates seek to maximise vote shares. Austen-
Smith shows that in a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium of the game candidates position in
such a way as to position their party’s policy at the median voter’s bliss point. In general,
candidates’ positions diﬀer across constituencies and parties. A crucial diﬀerence between
h i sp a p e ra n do u r si st h a th i sv o t e r sc a r ea b o u tp a r t yl o c a t i o n – t u r n i n gp a r t yc o m p e t i t i o n
into Downsian competition–whereas our voters care about the position of the candidate
elected in their own constituency. In that sense, his model may better resemble the British
system of parliamentary democracy where MPs have only loose ties to their constituencies,
5At ﬁrst pass, it may appear that parties would not care about candidates’ leadership prospects; after all,
someone will lead the party. However, the party would care if more talented leaders sometimes needed to
deviate further from party platform to win election, thereby compromising their leadership prospects.
6Nevertheless, it is not essential to the model that parties always ﬁeld candidates. In elections where both
candidates maintain party position, nothing would change if the disadvantaged party decided not to ﬁeld a
candidate. In this case, parties would only run candidates in constituencies where their equilibrium probability
of winning is positive.
5and ours the American congressional system where congress members have much stronger ties
to their constituencies. Certainly our model better reﬂects American gubernatorial elections,
where voters care only about their own governors. Levy (2004) models parties in the citizen-
candidate model of Besley and Coate (1997) and Osborne and Slivinski (1996) as being able
to credibly commit to positions to which candidates could not individually. In her model,
parties can only be eﬀective in a multidimensional policy space as they work by allowing
groups to exploit gains from trade from diﬀerent preferences across issues.
Snyder and Ting (2002) provide a model where parties function as brand names. Voters
have no information about candidates’ positions other than their party membership (or lack
thereof) and have preferences that depend upon both the mean and the variance of their
beliefs about candidates’ locations–they like candidates whom they expect to have a position
near their own but dislike variance in their beliefs. Snyder and Ting show that when parties
can reduce the variance of their members’ positions by choosing extreme locations, then in
equilibrium parties may prefer locating at the extremes than to locating at the centre.7
A number of authors have modiﬁed the Hotelling-Downs model of electoral competition in
ways that produce diﬀerentiated candidates. Wittman (1983) and Calvert (1985) show that
candidates may not converge when they care both about winning the election and about the
position of the winner. Palfrey (1984) demonstrates that when two established candidates
ﬁrst take positions before a third candidate decides whether and where to enter the race, the
established candidates diﬀerentiate to eliminate proﬁtable entry opportunities. Chan (2001),
Heidhues and Lagerlöf (2002), and Bernhardt, Duggan, and Squintani (2004) construct models
where candidates separate due to asymmetric information about voters’ preferences. Bern-
hardt and Ingberman (1985) model an incumbent with a reputation facing a challenger who
cannot reveal his position with certainty. When voters dislike risk, the incumbent need not
move to the median voter to defeat the challenger; hence, candidates diﬀerentiate. With the
exception of Palfrey (1984), all of these models bear more resemblance to our model of candi-
date competition than our model of party competition. In our model, candidates diﬀerentiate
because they start from diﬀerent party platforms, which produces an eﬀect similar to the
asymmetric information or heterogenous preferences in these other papers. (Our candidates
diﬀerentiate by using diﬀerent strategies, which in some cases are mixed. In the context
7Of course, if moving away from center decreased variance–if extremist parties were more heterogenous
rather than more homogenous as in Snyder and Ting (2002)–then parties in equilibrium would locate at the
center.
6of price competition, Bester, de Palma, Leininger, Thomas, and von Thadden (1996) have
pointed out that common mixed strategies produce ex post diﬀerentiation.) By contrast, in
our model parties diﬀerentiate despite symmetric starting points.
The intuition underlying our main result more closely resembles a literature in industrial
organisation on price competition between duopolists. Hotelling (1929) analyses a model of
two ﬁrms’ choosing spatial locations knowing that consumers face transport costs. When
prices are ﬁxed, he shows that ﬁrms locate at the same position. But d’Aspremont, Gab-
szewicz, and Thisse (1979) show that when spatial location precedes price competition, ﬁrms
exhibit maximal diﬀerentiation. While ﬁrms may wish to move together for given prices, they
wish to separate to gain market power in order to put up prices; this latter eﬀect dominates.
Costly relocation in our model plays a role similar to price competition in d’Aspremont, Gab-
szewicz and Thisse’s model. Konrad (1999) makes a related point in a model where ﬁrms
ﬁrst choose locations before competing in an all-pay auction for the right to sell a good to a
customer whose location is initially unknown; the winning ﬁrm pays the cost of transporta-
tion to the consumer. Once ﬁrms have located and the consumer’s position been revealed,
competition between ﬁrms takes the form of an all-pay auction with heterogenous, public val-
uations, a form of auction analysed by Baye, Kovenok, and de Vries (1993). Konrad (1999)
shows that ﬁrms diﬀerentiate so as to minimise industry transport costs. One key diﬀerence
from our paper is that in political competition, no candidate moves further than the median
voter. This resembles a bid cap in an all-pay auction, which generates equilibria in the second
stage of our game qualitatively diﬀerent from those in Baye et al.
Section 2 introduces the formal model. Section 3 analyses candidates’ ﬁnal positions taking
their initial positions as given. Section 4 analyses candidates’ choice of initial conditions.
Section 5 discusses voter welfare, and Section 6 concludes.
2A M o d e l
Two parties A and B compete in elections across a large number of constituencies. In each
constituency, the parties ﬁeld candidates, A and B, respectively, who compete in a ﬁrst-past-
the-post election with a continuum of voters. (For reasons described below, whether A denotes
party or candidate will be clear from context.) The election game comprises two periods, 1
and 2.I np e r i o d1, each party chooses a platform in the policy space [0,1].I np e r i o d2,i n
7each of the continuum of elections, candidates from the two parties compete. The winner
of each election receives a private beneﬁt of 2V> 0 and the loser nothing. A candidate’s
default position is her party’s position. However, she may take a position diﬀerent from her
p a r t y ’ sa tac o s t :i fC a n d i d a t eA’s party has platform a1, then choosing a2 in the second
period costs |a2 − a1|. The further a candidate moves from party platform, the higher the
costs the candidate pays; for simplicity the marginal cost is constant and normalised to one.
(As long as costs are linear, normalising marginal cost to one comes without loss of generality
as candidates’ behavior depends only on the ratio of V to the marginal cost of repositioning;
hence, an increase in V can also be interpreted as a decrease in that marginal cost.) After
observing candidates’ period 2 positions, voters elect one of the two candidates. Thus, if
Candidate A takes position a2 with party platform a1 and wins the election she receives a
payoﬀ of 2V −| a2 − a1|; if she loses the election she receives −|a2 − a1|.
Voters are indexed in [0,1], where a voter at position i incurs a utility of ui(x)=−|x −i|
when a candidate taking position x wins the election.8 Constituencies diﬀer in the location
of their median voters. The distribution of median voters across constituencies is uniform on
[0,1]. Parties wish to maximise their candidates’ average payoﬀs across all constituencies.9
3 Electoral Competition
This section analyses candidates’ location choices taking as given their party platforms. Let
Candidate A and Candidate B’s party platforms be denoted a1 and b1, respectively. Both
candidates know the median voter’s position, m. Because voter’s preferences are single-
peaked, whichever candidate locates closer to the median voter wins the election (Black,
1947). When candidates are equidistant from the median voter, we assume that each wins
the election with probability one-half. When |m −a1| < |m − b1| (|m − a1| < |m − b1|), then
Party A is closer (further) from the median voter, and we refer to Candidate A as being
advantaged (disadvantaged). In this section we assume that B is advantaged and further
that a1 ≤ b1 ≤ m. This comes without loss in generality, since parties are symmetric and the
8Our characterisation of equilibrium holds for any preferences that satisfy a single-crossing property and
any initial distribution of the median voter with a single peak. However, our welfare results in Section 5 depend
upon voters’ preferences (as well as upon more than the location of the median voter, as discussed in Section
5).
9The model can equally well be interpreted as one with a single constituency, where parties share the
common prior that the median voter is uniformly distributed on [0,1].
8winner of the election solely determined by the distances between the two candidates and the
median voter and not their distance from each other. Therefore, whenever a median voter
lies to the left of at least one of the candidates, we can think of the candidate closer to the
m e d i a nv o t e ra sC a n d i d a t eA (and the other as Candidate B). Candidates’ positions can be
thought of as being left of the median voter with the same distance from the median voter as
before.10
If Candidate A must incur costs larger than 2V to reach Party B’s platform (b1−a1 ≥ 2V ),
then Candidate A cannot challenge the election, and so both candidates optimally retain their
initial positions. Let a2 denote Candidate A’s position and b2 Candidate B’s. Deﬁnition 1
organsises elections into those where candidates move towards the median voter and those
where they do not, allowing for mixed strategies.
Deﬁnition 1 An election m is contested if Pr[a2 = a1] < 1 or Pr[b2 = b1] < 1.A ne l e c t i o n
is uncontested if it is not contested.
An election is uncontested if some candidate adheres to party platform with probability one.
When b1−a1 ≥ 2V , elections are uncontested. On the other hand, if A can draw closer to the
median voter than is B’s party at a cost of less than 2V (b1−a1 < 2V ), then both candidates’
adhering to their party platforms can no longer be an equilibrium: elections are contested.
In the case where m − a1 ≤ V , both candidates receive a positive payoﬀ by moving to the
median voter and winning with probability one-half. This constitutes an equilibrium, for each
wishes to move to the median voter given that the other does the same. If m−a1 >V,t h e n
A is unwilling to move to the median voter to win the election with probability one-half, and
therefore it is not an equilibrium for both candidates to move to the median voter. When
it is neither an equilibrium for both candidates to remain at their party platform nor an
equilibrium for both to move to the median voter, then the equilibrium must be in mixed
strategies.
If the distance between A and B is much smaller than that between A and the median
voter (i.e. B has a large advantage) then both candidates mix over positions to the right of
B: A tries to steal B’s election without moving all the way to the median voter, forcing B
to move towards the median voter to fend oﬀ A. On the other hand, if the distance between
10One can interpret the period 2 game as a complete-information, common-value, all-pay auction with a bid
cap (the median voter’s position) and handicap (Candidate B’s advantage). We know of no paper addressing
such auctions.
9A and B is not much smaller than that between A and the median voter (i.e. B has a small
advantage), then A ﬁnds it more proﬁtable to directly adopt the median voter’s position than
to attempt to outmaneuver B; in this case, each candidate retains her initial position with
positive probability and jumps directly to the median voter with complementary probability.
In both cases, candidates remain at their initial positions with positive probability. Because
for some parameter conﬁgurations candidates’ mixed-strategies are cumbersome to describe,
we relegate precise characterisation of the equilibrium to Proposition 4 in the appendix.
Proposition 1 summarises equilibrium.
Proposition 1 If V< m −a1 candidates adhere to their party platforms with positive proba-
bility. Apart from these initial positions, their strategies have common support. The strategy
of the advantaged Candidate B ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates that of the disadvantaged
Candidate A.11
Because the advantaged candidate’s strategy ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates the disad-
vantaged candidate’s strategy, and clearly no candidate moves to the right of m, Proposition 1
implies that the advantaged candidate wins the election at least as often as the disadvantaged
candidate. Without the normalisation that both candidates’ initial positions lie to the left
of m, Proposition 1 means that the distance between the disadvantaged candidate and the
median voter ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates the distribution between the advantaged
candidate and the median voter.
Characterising ﬁrst-period behavior requires only the candidates’ continuation payoﬀs for
each proﬁle of ﬁrst-period positions; these are (almost always) unique.
Proposition 2 Assume a1 ≤ b1 ≤ m. The disadvantaged Candidate A’s expected payoﬀ in
the continuation equilibrium is as follows:
UA (a1,b 1,m)=
 
V − m + a1 if m − a1 <V
0 otherwise.





min{2V,b1 − a1} if V ≤ m − a1+b1
2
2(V − m + b1) if m − a1+b1
2 <V <m− a1
V − m + b1 if m − a1 <V .
11The distribution F ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates the distribution G if for each x, F(x) ≤ G(x).
10When m − a1 <V , both candidates move to the median voter’s position, in which case
each gets one-half the value of winning the election minus the costs of relocation. When
m − a1 >V, because in equilibrium the disadvantaged candidate adheres to party platform
with positive probability–where she receives a payoﬀ of zero–she must get zero expected
payoﬀ.
The advantaged candidate’s payoﬀ depends upon her distance to the disadvantaged can-
didate as well as each candidate’s distance to the median voter. To organise elections, we
divide them into two classes that depend upon where the median voter is realised relative to
party platforms.
Deﬁnition 2 An election is extremal if m ≥ V + 1
2 (a1 + b1).A ne l e c t i o ni scentral if it is
not extremal.12
An election is extremal if the median voter lies suﬃciently far from party platforms. If
b1 − a1 > 2V ,t h e nm ≥ b1 >a 1 implies that m>V+ 1
2 (a1 + b1): uncontested elections are
extremal. The only other extremal elections are those where A m i x e st ot h er i g h to fB when
A’s party platform lies far from the median voter as described above. Proposition 2 states
that in extremal elections the advantaged candidate’s expected payoﬀ does not depend upon
his distance from the median voter: either he wins for sure without moving and gets 2V ,o r
A challenges, and B’s expected payoﬀ equals his initial distance from A.
In central elections, B’s payoﬀ increases the closer his initial position to the median voter.
However, the rate at which his payoﬀ changes as a function of the distance between his
initial position and the median voter is not constant. When m − a1 = V , B moves to the
median voter for sure, and A, who is indiﬀerent between moving to the median voter and
remaining at party platform, moves to the median voter with suﬃciently high probability.13
As m − a1 increases–holding everything else constant–A prefers to remain at her party
platform. To keep A indiﬀerent over moving to the median voter and remaining at her party
platform, B cannot move to the median voter with probability one. To make B indiﬀerent
over moving to the median voter and remaining at his party platform, A must adhere to her
party platform with suﬃciently high probability. Thus, the probability that A moves to the





or |b1 − a1| > 2V (and central if not extremal).
13The probability that A stays at her initial position aﬀects B’s equilibrium payoﬀ, which explains why
Proposition 2 excludes the case m − a1 = V . For any a1 and b1, the event that m − a1 = V occurs with zero
probability and therefore does not aﬀect parties’ expected continuation payoﬀs.
11median voter jumps down as m−a1 moves through V ,a n ds oB’s expected payoﬀ jumps up.
For m−a1 <V–competition is tough–B beneﬁts much less from being close to the median
voter than when m − a1 >V–competition is weak.
To summarise, unless both candidates move to the median voter with probability one,
the disadvantaged candidate receives a payoﬀ of zero. In extremal elections, the advantaged
candidate’s payoﬀ depends upon her distance from the disadvantaged candidate, while in
central elections it depends upon her distance from the median voter. Among central elections,
the advantaged candidate has more incentive to be close to the median voter when equilibrium
is in mixed strategies than when it is in pure strategies: in the former case, being closer to the
median voter reduces competition with the disadvantaged candidate, whereas in the latter it
does not.
While mixed strategies in electioneering may strike some readers as unrealistic, we believe
that they lend themselves to a natural interpretation. Suppose that over the course of a
campaign each candidate makes a large number of speeches. In diﬀerent speeches, the candi-
date may advocate diﬀerent positions.14 On election morning, a newspaper samples from all
these speeches and identiﬁes the candidate’s position; at this point, candidates can no longer
campaign. On election day, voters read the newspaper, learn the candidates’ positions, and
vote. From Candidate B’s perspective, Candidate A plays a mixed strategy; B cannot best
respond to A’s actual position but only the distribution from which it is drawn. Knowing that
the newspaper samples randomly from her speeches, a candidate indiﬀerent over her many
policy positions is indiﬀerent over all probability distributions over these positions; hence,
her equilibrium policy distribution is indeed a best response to her opponent’s behavior. In
short, by appearing to endorse diﬀerent positions, a candidate does something tantamount to
mixing.15 Of course, a mixed equilibrium in our model can also be interpreted as the limit of
pure-strategy equilibria of nearby incomplete-information games. In any event, the fact that
equilibrium is in mixed strategies does not drive our main results below, as discussed in the
conclusion.
14In equilibrium, the order of speeches plays no role.
15Aragones and Postlewaite (2002) show that candidates in a Downsian model may choose to be ambiguous
when both voters and rival candidates cannot observe true positions. By contrast, under our interpretation,
all the uncertainty is resolved before voters vote.
Changing the model to allow one candidate to move ﬁrst, e.g. the advantaged candidate is a Stackelberg
leader, would not aﬀect equilibrium if the leader can still play a mixed strategy, as beﬁts the interpretation
here.
124 Platform Location
This section analyses parties’ platform choice. Parties maximise their candidates’ utility
taking into account how their platform choice aﬀects subsequent campaigning. When the
private beneﬁt of winning election, V , is not too large, parties adopt distinct platforms, one
to the right of 1
2 and the other to the left. In central elections, the advantaged candidate’s
utility decreases in her distance from the median voter; this gives parties incentive to minimise
the expected distance between their platform and the median voter. In extremal elections,
the advantaged candidate’s utility increases the further her party’s platform lies from the
opponent’s; this provides parties incentive to diﬀerentiate from each other. However, the fact
that not all central elections aﬀect candidates’ payoﬀ in the same way–candidates have more
incentive to be near the median voter when equilibria are in mixed strategies–creates another
motive for party diﬀerentiation. When choosing platforms, parties trade oﬀ these eﬀects.
We begin by demonstrating why it cannot be an equilibrium for both parties to locate
at one-half for all values of V . Suppose that Party B positions its platform at one-half,
and consider A’s choosing between the platforms 1
2 and 1
2 − 2V ,f o rw h i c hw er e q u i r eV<
1
4. Locating at one-half maximises the probability of winning; parties solely interested in
winning would choose one-half as in the original Hotelling-Downs model.16 Yet, as argued
in the previous section, electoral competition in the second period is toughest precisely when
candidates begin from the same position. When their distance from the median voter exceeds
V , each candidate receives an expected payoﬀ of zero: competition eliminates all the private
beneﬁts of winning the election. When their distance from the median voters is less than
V , each candidate adopts the median voter’s position and wins with probability one-half.
On average in these elections, the median voter’s distance from one-half is V
2 ,s oe a c hp a r t y
receives a payoﬀ of V − V
2 = V
2 . The probability that the median voter lies within V of
one-half is 2V , so each party’s expected payoﬀ is V 2. Now consider instead A’s choosing
the platform 1
2 − 2V . Whenever the median voter lies to the left of A’s platform, B does
not challenge the election, and A wins 2V without campaigning; such elections occur with
probability 1
2 −2V . Because with any other median voter A’s payoﬀ is certainly non-negative,
16To see this, suppose that one party positions at
1
2 − k1 and the other at
1
2 + k2, where k1 >k 2 > 0. The
model is symmetric on [0,1 − (k1 − k2)], and therefore each wins half of these elections. Since the party at
1
2 + k2 is advantaged in the remaining elections, which she wins with greater probability than her opponent
by Proposition 1, she wins a larger share of elections. More generally, whichever candidate locates closer to
one-half wins more elections, and hence equilibrium has both locating at one-half.
13A’s expected payoﬀ from platform 1




2V = V − 4V 2.
Since V −4V 2 >V2 whenever V<1
5,b o t hp a r t i e sd on o tc h o o s ep l a t f o r m si nt h ec e n t r ef o r
small V .
Theorem 1 describes the unique payoﬀ-symmetric, pure-strategy equilibrium in party
platforms, denoted by a1 and b1, illustrated in the ﬁgure below.17


















2 ≥ V ≥ 1
6,  1





When V ≥ 1
2, parties do not diﬀerentiate and locate at one-half. For high V winning the
election with probability one-half is suﬃciently valuable that candidates always adopt the
median voter’s position; as a result, neither party can soften competition by separating from
the other.










Party Platforms as a Function of V
When V< 1/6, parties maintain an equilibrium distance of 2V , the private value of
winning the election. Central elections are contested, but extremal elections are not. From
17For some values of V (but not others) payoﬀ-asymmetric equilibria also exist. For instance, for suﬃciently




2 +2 V ) is also an equilibrium. In addition, since the ﬁrst-period game is symmetric
with expected payoﬀs that are continuous in party platform, the game has a symmetric equilibrium, which is
in mixed strategies. Naturally all these equilibria also involve candidate diﬀerentiation.
14Deﬁnition 2, using the fact that in equilibrium a1+b1 =1 , parties position in such a way that
elections are central if and only if the median voter lies between the two parties’ platforms.
No candidate contests an election whose median voter lies on the other side of the opposing
party platform. Parties have no incentive to take more extreme positions, which would not
aﬀect their payoﬀ in extremal elections (2V ) but would lower their payoﬀ in central elections.
Nor do they have incentive to take more central positions. To see this, suppose that Party
B moves to the centre by ε>0. First, this lessens B’s average distance from the median
voter in central elections, increasing his expected payoﬀ by ε times the likelihood of a central
election in which B is advantaged. Second, it reduces the distance between candidates below
2V , making all elections contested. In this case, B’s payoﬀ in extremal elections falls from 2V
to the distance between parties, 2V − ε.T h i sd e c r e a s e sB’s payoﬀ by ε times the likelihood
of an extremal election in which B is advantaged. For small V , the probability that the
median voter is realised between the two candidates is small–most elections are extremal–
and consequently candidates have more to lose than to gain by moving to the centre .
As V increases, each party wishes to move away from centre to maintain a distance of 2V
from the other in order to secure its “home turf”; by moving too close to each other, parties
would eliminate uncontested elections where their payoﬀs are highest. On the other hand, as
V increases, this set of extremal elections shrinks. Consequently, parties’ incentive to move
to the centre to decrease their costs of winning contested, central elections grows larger by
comparison. For V<1
6, the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates, and parties keep a distance of 2V :p a r t i e s
diﬀerentiate as V increases.
For V>1
6, parties separate by less than 2V such that all elections are contested. To
get an intuition for how V aﬀects party platforms, suppose that parties start in equilibrium,
a n dc o n s i d e ra ni n c r e a s ei nV . This expands the set of central elections, where candidates’
payoﬀs depend upon their distance from the median voter. Such elections take two forms:
either both candidates move to the median voter with probability one, or they maintain their
party platforms with positive probability and move to the median voter with complementary
probability. Among all central elections, the median, median voter is located at one-half
regardless of V . Hence, if candidates had the same incentive to move to the median voter in
all central elections, increasing V would not aﬀect party platforms. But they do not. Section
3 describes how an advantaged candidate’s payoﬀ doubles as the disadvantaged candidate
goes from adopting the median voter’s position with probability one to mixing between the
15median voter’s position and party platform. Consequently, candidates have twice the incentive
to move to the median voter in those central elections where equilibrium is in mixed strategies.
As V increases, this region remains constant in size and moves to the exterior, away from
one-half, at the rate V . Since parties care more about being near the median median voter in
this region than in other central elections, as V increases they move away from one-half. But
because the size of central elections with equilibrium in pure strategies grows as V increases,
and the median, median voter in these elections remains at the midpoint between party
platforms, parties move away from one-half at a rate slower than V .
To summarise, when the private beneﬁt of election is low (or, alternatively, when cam-
paign costs are high), the two parties maintain enough distance between them that the only
contested elections are those with median voters lying between the parties. In other words,
parties are always (weakly) more extreme than their members. As depicted in Figure 1, as
V increases, each party moves away from one-half at the rate V . When the private beneﬁt
of election is high (or campaign costs are low), all elections are contested: parties separate
by less than 2V . Nevertheless, as V increases, electoral competition increases, which shifts
the set of elections that a given party wins with probability greater than one-half away from
one-half. Since it is in these elections that parties have the most incentive to locate close to
t h em e d i a nv o t e r ,t h e ym o v ea w a yf r o mo n e - h a l fa sV increases.
Like in the standard Downsian model, parties here care about winning. But the fact
that winning elections sometimes requires campaign expenditures means that parties care
not about the private beneﬁt of winning but rather the private beneﬁt of winning net of
campaign costs. In equilibrium, parties do not have incentive to move to the centre to
provide their candidates with incentive to win more elections, for if winning such elections
gave strictly positive payoﬀs, then candidates would choose to win them anyway; in other
words, moving to the centre to capture these elections cannot have a ﬁrst-order eﬀect on
expected payoﬀs. Rather, they care about being close to the median voter in elections where
they are advantaged. A simple economic intuition underlies why their incentive to do so
is higher in elections where equilibrium is in mixed strategies. Consider the eﬀect on an
advantaged party’s payoﬀ of being ε closer to the median voter. If both candidates travel to
the median voter with probability one, then this increases the advantaged candidate’s payoﬀ
by ε. Now consider a mixed equilibrium, ﬁxing the strategy of the disadvantaged candidate.
If the advantaged candidate always goes to the median voter, then being ε closer increases
16her payoﬀ by ε. But this leads the disadvantaged candidate never to go to the median voter,
further increasing the advantaged candidate’s payoﬀ. Candidates have more incentive to be
near the median voter when this diminishes electoral competition.
5V o t e r W e l f a r e
A natural question is how voter welfare depends upon party platform. Given candidates’
incentive to move to the median voter in the second period, do parties diﬀerentiate too little
or too much to maximise voter welfare?
Since voter i’s utility from policy x is ui(x)=−|x − i|, the welfare-maximising policy
(that which maximises the sum of voters’ utilities) is located at the median voter’s ideal
point (independent of the distribution of voters).19 When V>1
2, candidates always move
to the median voter with certainty, and so parties’ platforms maximise voter welfare. But
for V<1
2 candidates do not always move to the median voter with certainty, in which case
party platforms may not maximise voter welfare. When candidates do not always adopt the
median voter’s preferred policy, voter welfare depends on more than the distance between the
elected candidate and the median voter’s ideal point. In this case, aggregating voters’ utilities
requires information about the distribution of voters’ ideal points.
No two pairs of distinct party platforms can be ranked according to voter welfare without
knowing more about the distribution of voters’ bliss-points than its median. To illustrate,
consider initial positions a1 and b1, and assume that for each realisation of the median voter,
m, slightly more than half the voters have bliss points at m,w h i l et h er e s th a v eb l i s sp o i n t s
at either a1 or b1, whichever is closer to m. For all realisations of m, the winning candidate’s
policy is almost optimal. This follows from the fact that staying at the initial platform (or
moving to any position between this and the median voter) leads to almost the same voter
welfare as moving to the median voter. Thus, for some distribution of voters’ ideal points
(where the median ideal point is uniform on [0,1]), (a1,b 1) is almost optimal.
When V =1 /2, there exist two equilibria: one where both parties locate at one-half
and each candidate moves to the median voter with probability one, and one where parties
choose platforms at 1
4 and 3
4 and candidates only sometimes go to the median voter. Common
p l a t f o r m sa to n e - h a l fa r eb e t t e rf o rv o t e r st h a nd i s t i n c tp l a t f o r m sb yt h ea r g u m e n ta b o v e .I f
19An ε deviation away from the median voter would decrease utility for more than half of the voters by ε
and increase utility for less than half the voters, also by ε.
17we can rule out distributions of bliss points such as the one described above, a similar result
holds for V slightly less than one-half: platforms at one-half are strictly better for voters
than those chosen by the parties in equilibrium. With platforms at one-half, candidates
would always move to any median voter other than those very close to the boundaries of the
political spectrum. To these median voters candidates will move with high probability that
c a nb em a d ea r b i t r a r i l yc l o s et oo n e ,f o rV suﬃciently close to one-half. On the other hand,
given their parties’ equilibrium platforms, candidates will never move to median voters close
to zero or one with probability higher than 1
2. As long as having the winning voter adopt the
median voter’s position is strictly better for voters than any other position, the costs of not
moving to m cannot become arbitrarily small, and consequently voters are better oﬀ with
common platforms at one-half.
For small V the situation is diﬀerent. In equilibrium, platforms are located centrally
at 1
2 − V and 1
2 + V , and candidates maintain their party platforms in extremal elections,
where strictly more than half of voters’ bliss points are either to the left of 1
2 − V or to
the right of 1
2 + V . Moving platforms outward increases welfare in the likely event that
m is realised outside
 1
2 − V, 1
2 + V
 
. When m is realised between party platforms, moving
platforms outward decreases voters’ welfare, since it increases the distance to most voters and
reduces the probability (and distance) that candidates move towards them. Nevertheless, for
small V these costs are outweighed by the gains from m/ ∈
 1
2 − V, 1
2 + V
 
.I nt h i ss e n s e ,w e
ﬁnd that for small V parties platforms are too close together.
To formally state and prove these results we must exclude extreme distributions of voters’
bliss points such as the one described above, which nevertheless leaves a very large class of
distributions. A suﬃcient restriction is that the distributions have no gaps. Let (Fm)m∈[0,1]
be a collection of distributions of voters’ bliss points parameterised by its median m.
Deﬁnition 3 (Fm)m∈[0,1] is regular i ft h e r ee x i s t ss o m ec o n s t a n tk>0 such that for each











Voters’ bliss points are regular if they put mass around any policy in (0,1) that cannot become
arbitrary small as m changes. In particular, whatever the median bliss point, the distribution
o fb l i s sp o i n t sp u t sm a s sa r o u n dt h a tm e d i a n .
Proposition 3 Assume that the collection of voters’ distributions of bliss points is regular. If
V is close to one-half then in equilibrium parties’ platform choices are too extreme to maximise
18welfare, i.e. voters prefer platforms at one-half. If V is close to zero then parties’ equilibrium
platform choices are too central to maximise welfare, i.e. voters prefer platforms further away
from each other.
Proposition 3 provides limit results in the sense that for V close enough to one-half
(zero) the parties’ platform choices are too extreme (central). When campaign costs are very
high–parties are tightly whipped–parties are too centrist. When campaign costs are very
low–parties are very loosely whipped–parties are too extremist.
A diﬀerent question is whether voters beneﬁt from an increase in V, or equivalently from
subsidised campaigning. Clearly, voter welfare is maximised if V>1
2 since candidates always
take the median voter’s position. For V>1
2, the eﬀect of a marginal increase in V depends
on the distribution of voters’ bliss points in every constituency and is therefore ambiguous.
If, however, voter welfare in each constituency is a linear function of the distance between the
median voter and elected candidate, then increasing V raises voter welfare.
6 Conclusion
This paper provides a rationale for diﬀerentiation between ex ante identical political parties in
a Hotelling-Downs-style model of electoral competition. In our model, parties are benevolent
to their many purely-opportunistic candidates running in distinct constituencies with diﬀerent
voter preferences. Parties choose policy platforms that serve as their candidates’ default
campaign positions. Candidates may deviate from party platform to increase the probability
of winning their constituency at a cost: the more they deviate, the higher these “campaign
costs.” We ﬁnd that parties do not adopt the platform that maximises the number of elections
their candidates win. Instead, they take less central platforms and separate from each other
to avoid costly campaigns in most constituencies. Each party carves out a “home turf,”
constituencies where their candidates can win with little or no campaigning. Decreasing
campaign costs causes parties to move further apart: because candidates campaign more
vigorously, each party must move further from the other to carve out its home turf.
Our intention in this in this paper has been to re-explore the eﬀects of political competition
on electoral positioning. Many commentators have observed that political candidates seldom
espouse the same policies. This paper provides an explanation for this ﬁnding in terms of
political parties: candidates diﬀer because their parties diﬀer; parties diﬀer to reduce political
19competition and thereby avoid campaign costs (e.g., unpalatable promises to special interests).
Other authors have oﬀered other compelling reasons for political diﬀerentiation, and we do not
suggest that party competition constitutes the sole reason for policy diﬀerentiation. However,
we think it an important exercise to understand how electoral competition pulls candidates
together and how it drives them apart.20
A crucial assumption that drives party diﬀerentiation is that candidates incur costs by
deviating from party platform. In this paper we assume that candidates pay these campaign
costs whether or not they win election. But some reasons why candidates may ﬁnd deviating
from party policy costly (e.g. diminished leadership prospects) may loom larger when they win
than when they lose. If campaign costs were paid only by winning candidates, our qualitative
results would be unaﬀected. In this case too, the closer the parties’ platforms, the more intense
would be electoral competition (the higher candidates’ campaign costs in equilibrium). Here,
however, the disadvantaged candidate could move 2V from her platform before incurring
a negative payoﬀ. When V>1
4, both parties would choose platforms at 1
2,a n di ne v e r y
constituency both candidates would adopt the median voter’s position with certainty. When
V ≤ 1
4, parties would choose platforms at 1
2 −V and 1
2 +V , and constituencies with extreme
median voters would go uncontested. Here too the degree to which candidates diﬀerentiate
increases in V (or, equivalently, decreases in campaign costs). The fact that in this model
all continuation equilibria are in pure strategies underscores the fact that diﬀerentiation in
our model is not an artifact of candidates’ playing mixed strategies. The absence of mixing
in this model also allows it the following, alternative interpretation: candidates have policy
preferences; parties have none; and the winning party must pay a cost to attract a candidate
whose preferred policy diﬀers from its platform.
The structure of the main result (in Theorem 1) is also robust to the assumption that the
median voter’s bliss point is uniformly distributed. It holds for any continuous, single-peaked
distribution of the median voter’s location. As V increases from zero, the parties’ equilibrium
platforms separate more and more until V reaches a critical size, at which point parties locate
at one-half. The intuition that underlies equilibrium when V ≤ 1
6 does not rely on uniformity.
For V suﬃciently small, parties separate their platforms by 2V .21 Moving further apart only
20An open, empirical question is how much candidates in elections without parties diﬀer from each other
relative to those in elections with parties.
21The maximum value of V for which parties maintain a distance of 2V does depend on the distribution
and can be no larger than 1
6, for the uniform distribution has more variance than any other single-peaked
distribution.
20diminishes payoﬀs for central median voters, whereas moving further together costs more in
the many extremal elections than it beneﬁts in the few central elections. However, unlike in
our model, when V>1
6 comparative statics may no longer be monotone, as the intuition
behind our arguments depended upon a comparison of the measure of constituencies where
candidates always adopt the median voter’s preferred position to those where candidates mix
between that and their party platforms.
While departing from party platform may aﬀect candidates in any number of ways, it is
essential to our model that deviating from party platform do more than cost votes in the
election at hand. Suppose that there were no explicit campaign costs, but instead that each
candidate’s probability of winning the election had the following properties: it decreased in
her distance from the median voter; decreased in her distance from party platform; increased
in her opponent’s distance from the median voter; and increased in the diﬀerence between
her opponent’s position and party platform. Then parties would not diﬀerentiate and hence
would locate at one-half. A party that deviated from one-half would ﬁnd its candidates
disadvantaged in most constituencies, and hence would win less than one half of constituencies.
Nevertheless, we believe that in most elections deviating from party platform does not have
this kind of zero-sum structure and therefore that our model captures an important aspect of
electoral competition.
Parliamentary parties care about winning a majority of constituencies. Parties that traded
payoﬀ in our model oﬀ against the probability of winning a majority in a smooth way would
adopt platforms of one-half in any payoﬀ-symmetric equilibrium; if not, then one party could
go from winning a majority with probability one-half to winning a majority with probability
one by only an inﬁnitessimal change in position. However, introducing noise into the model–
for example, having voters vote based on idiosyncratic taste parameters–would restore party
diﬀerentiation, as parties could no longer discretely change their probability of winning a
majority with a small change in position.
In our model, party platforms are chosen to maximise their candidates’ average payoﬀs.
If candidates chose their party platform in a majoritarian election, the result would be very
diﬀerent. Each candidate wishes her party would locate its platform at her constituency’s
median voter regardless of the other party’s location. It is easy to verify that candidates’ pref-
erences over their party’s location satisfy Gans and Smart’s (1996) single-crossing condition,
implying that their median bliss point–the median, median voter–is a Condorcet winner.
21This equilibrium diﬀers so dramatically from ours because a majoritarian party would not
trade gains in one constituency oﬀ against losses in another. Here candidates could make mu-
tually advantageous trades, for instance by having more extremist candidates pay centrists’
campaign costs in return for a move away from centre.
Finally, although we have interpreted our formal model in terms of parties and candidates,
it can also be applied to a single election. Consider two candidates campaigning over the
course of a long election process, where candidates learn information about voters’ preferences
as the campaign progresses. A stylised version of this strategic setting coincides with our
two-period model: candidates take initial policy positions; they then learn the median voter’s
preferences; and last they take ﬁnal positions, where departing from initial position is costly.
Many of the reasons that motivate campaign costs in our original model apply equally well in
this setting. Candidates will split the political spectrum at the outset of the campaign, each
candidate betting on a median voter near her position that would allow her to win the election
at minimal cost. Alternatively, the formal model also ﬁts two long-term parties competing
across a number of elections over time, where median voters vary but party positions remain
constant.
One domain where our model can help shed light is to redistricting. If two parties had
strictly conﬂicting interests, then a form of “no-trade theorem” should exist for redisticting:
parties should never agree to redraw constituencies, for the one’s advantage is the other’s
disadvantage. In our model, of course, parties do not have conﬂicting interests. Suppose that
the parties, having already ﬁxed their platforms, could agree to transform two constituencies
with median voters located one-half into one with a median voter at zero and another with a
median voter located at one. They would, for doing so increases each party’s expected payoﬀ:
one uncontested constituency is more valuable than two heavily-contested ones.
7 Appendix
The following Lemma helps to characterise the continuation equilibria in the second period.
As in Section 3 we assume without loss of generality that a1 ≤ b1 ≤ m. A strategy of candidate
i is given by a cumulative distribution function Fi,i∈{ A,B}, on [0,1], where Fi (x) denotes
the probability that candidate i chooses a policy platform smaller or equal to x. We say that
the probability distribution Fi has an atom at x if it puts positive probability on x, i.e. x is
chosen with probability Fi (x) − limy↓x Fi (y) > 0. For positions x<ywe say that Fi has a
22gap between x and y if it puts no mass on the interval (x,y), i.e. Fi (y)=Fi (x).
Lemma 1 Each continuation equilibrium (FA (x),F B (x)) must have the following properties:
1. If a candidate’s strategy has a gap between x ≥ b1 and y<mthen it must have a gap
between x and m, and also the other candidate’s strategy must have a gap between x
and m.
2. A candidate’s strategy can only have an atom at her party platform or at m.
Proof:
Note ﬁrst that both candidates’ strategies cannot have an atom at the same policy x<m .
Suppose that both candidates move to x<mwith positive probability. Then a position
slightly larger than x yields a higher payoﬀ for candidate A (and likewise for candidate B),
since the cost of moving there is only marginally larger whereas the probability of winning is
signiﬁcantly increased.
1. Suppose that the strategy of candidate X has a gap between x and y but none between x
and m. Denote the position where the gap ends by z,i.e. z := argsupw {w|Fi (w) >F i (x)}.
We have x ≤ z<m .Moving into a gap in the other candidate’s strategy can never
be optimal, for a small decrease in position would decrease costs without aﬀecting the
probability of winning. Therefore it must be that both candidates’ strategies have a
gap between x and z but not between x and z +ε for all ε>0. But since both cannot
have atoms at z  = m, at least one candidate could improve by moving into (x,z) (which
would reduce costs without changing the winning probability).
2. Clearly, no candidate moves into (a1,b 1). If one candidate’s strategy has an atom at
x ∈ (b1,m),then there exists some ε>0 such that the other candidate will not put
mass in (x − ε,x) (moving slightly above x would increase payoﬀs). But with a gap
between x − ε and x, the candidate with the atom at x could improve by moving into
(x − ε,x).
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1:
23The statement that both strategies have common support between b1 and m follows from
Lemma 1. Furthermore, it is not possible for only one candidate to have an atom at m,f o ri f
so, then the other candidate must have a gap between some x and m (since otherwise moving
to m is strictly better for that candidate than moving close to m), and hence it would be
proﬁtable to move from m into (x,m).
To prove the ﬁrst statement, ﬁrst note that because V< m − a1, A is unwilling to move
to m. Either both candidates stay at their party platform for certain or, because strategies
elsewhere have common support, they mix on (b1,r) for some r ≤ m (with strict inequality
when one candidate has an atom at m). B’s strategy must have an atom at b1, since otherwise
A would not move to b1 (where she would incur costs but never win). Assume now that A’s
strategy does not have an atom at a1, which implies that candidate B has zero payoﬀ in
equilibrium. We distinguish two cases: both candidates have an atom at m,o rn e i t h e rh a s
an atom at m (it is impossible that only one has an atom at m). In the latter case, both
candidates win for sure by moving to r. If B moves to r in equilibrium, then her payoﬀ
there is zero and hence A’s payoﬀ must be negative, which cannot happen in equilibrium.
So suppose B moves to m with probability PB (m). Both candidates must mix on (b1,r)
with the same density; changing positions within this interval changes costs in the same way
for both candidates and hence must also change winning probabilities in the same way. If
we denote common mass that strategies put on (b1,r) by M,i . e .M := FA (r) − FA (b1)=
FB (r) − FB (b1), then B’s payoﬀ from moving to m is 2VM+ V (1 −M) − m + b1,w h i c h
must equal zero. A’s payoﬀ from moving to m is 2V (1 − PB (m))+VP B (m)−m+a1,w h i c h
must equal her payoﬀ at b1, 2V (1 − M −Pb (m)) − b1 + a1. Hence,
2V (1 − PB (m)) + VP B (m) − m + a1 =2 V (1 − M − Pb (m)) − b1 + a1
⇒ 2VM+ VP b (m) − m + b1 =0
⇒ Pb (m)=1− M.
B u tt h i si m p l i e st h a tB does not stay at b1 with positive probability, a contradiction.
The last statement follows immediately from Proposition 4 below.
Q.E.D.
Proposition 4 Let a1 ≤ b1 ≤ m. The following constitutes the unique continuation equilib-
rium:
24• If b1 − a1 ≥ 2V , then both candidates retain party platform.
• If b1 − a1 ≤ 2V ≤ m − a1, then both candidates retain their party platforms with
probability b1−a1
2V and randomise continuously on (b1,2V + a1) with density 1
2V .
• If 2m − a1 − b1 ≥ 2V ≥ m − a1, then both candidates retain their party platforms
with probability b1−a1
2V , take the median voter’s position with probability 2V −m+a1
V ,a n d
randomise continuously on (b1,2m − a1 − 2V ) with density 1
2V .
• If 2m − 2a1 ≥ 2V ≥ 2m − a1 − b1, then candidate A retains her party platform with
probability V −m+b1
V and takes the median voter’s position with probability m−b1
V .C a n d i -
date B retains his party platform with probability m−V −a1
V and takes the median voter’s
position with probability 2V +a1−m
V .
• If V ≥ m − a1, then both candidates take the median voter’s position.22
Proof: To win the election A must move at least as far as b1.I fb1 − a1 ≥ 2V ,t h ec o s to f
doing so exceeds the beneﬁt of winning the election, so A remains at a1. Henceforth, assume
that b1 − a1 < 2V . From Lemma 1 we know that the strategies’ support can only contain
party platforms, an interval [b1,r],f o rs o m eb1 <r<m ,a n dm. In particular, strategies can-
not have atoms in (b1,r]. Furthermore, since each position in [b1,r] yields the same expected
payoﬀ, whenever b1 <x<y<r ,f o re a c hi ∈{ A,B}, 2V (Fi (y) − Fi (x)) = y − x:t h ev a l u e
of the additional probability of winning at y relative to x must equal the increase in the cost
of moving to y from x.I f V< m − a1 Proposition 1 implies that A’s payoﬀ is zero, and
therefore FB (b1)=b1−a1
2V . Using these properties, we can ﬁnd equilibrium in the diﬀerent
cases.
If m − a1 <V always moving to m results in a positive payoﬀ for both parties and is
therefore the only equilibrium.









if b1 ≤ x,
22Equilibrium is unique up to redeﬁning cases by changing strict inequalities to weak ones. Doing so would
not aﬀect parties’ expected continuation payoﬀs as the boundaries of these diﬀerent regions occur with prob-
ability zero.
25which determines A’s strategy.
If V< m − a1 < 2V both candidates move to m with a positive probability (if one did
not, then the other could improve her payoﬀ by moving to m). Again denote the probability
that B moves to m as PrB (m). The fact that A makes zero proﬁt implies 2V (1 − PrB (m))+
V PrB (m)=m − a1,w h i c hg i v e sPrB (m)=2V −m+a1
V .
A might mix between a1 and m or mix among {a1}∪(b1,r] ∪{ m} with b1 <r≤ m.I f
1 − PrB (m)=m−a1−V
V ≤ b1−a1
2V ,t h e nA must conﬁne her mixing to a1 and m,s i n c em o v i n g
slightly beyond b1 results in a negative payoﬀ. This implies that B also only mixes between





0 if x<b 1
m−V −a1
V if b1 ≤ x<m
1 if x = m.
B’s payoﬀ follows from the indiﬀerence condition m−b1 = V PrA (m),w h e r ePrA (m) denotes
the mass A puts on m,w h i c hg i v e sFA (x).
If m−a1−V
V > b1−a1
2V we must have that PrB (b1)=b1−a1
2V and A mixes on {a1}∪(b1,r]∪{m}.
A’s indiﬀerence condition gives that PrB (m)=2V −m+a1
V . Since 1 − PrB (b1) − PrB (m)=
2m−a1−b1−2V
2V , r =2 m−a1−2V ,w h i c hg i v e sFB (x).A ’s strategy follows from B’s indiﬀerence













(m) − m + b1.
Hence, PrA (m)=2V +a1−m
V .
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: Candidates’ payoﬀs can be directly computed from the unique
equilibrium given in Proposition 4. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 1: Assume A’s party takes platform a1 and B’s b1. Without loss of
generality, 0 ≤ a1 ≤ b1 ≤ 1. Candidates’ payoﬀ for any realisation of m can be derived from





(2m − b1,2m − a1) if m<a 1
(2m − b1,a 1) if a1 ≤ m ≤ a1+b1
2
(a1,2m − b1) if a1+b1
2 <m≤ b1
(a1,b 1) if b1 <m .
Using this, we can calculate A’s expected payoﬀ UA (a1,b 1) from platforms (a1,b 1) from
Corollary 2. When b1 − a1 ≥ 2V , candidates never depart from party platform for median
26voters below a1+b1
2 −V (or those above a1+b1
2 +V ). For no realisations of m do both candidates
either move to m o rm i xb e t w e e np a r t yp l a t f o r ma n dm. Hence,











(b1 −2m + a1)dm (1)
and ∂
∂a1UA (a1,b 1)=V> 0. Hence, b1 − a1 ≤ 2V in equilibrium.
When b1−a1 < 2V , equilibrium can take any of the mixed forms described in Proposition
4. A’s payoﬀ is nonzero if and only if m<V+a1. If b1 −V< m < V+ a1, both candidates
move to m for sure. If a1+b1
2 − V< m < b 1 − V , both parties mix on party platform with
probability V −m+b1
V and the median voter with probability m−b1
V (note that since b1−a1 < 2V
t h i sc a no n l yh a p p e nl e f to fa1 and right of b1). If m<a1+b1
2 − V candidate A receives a
utility of b1 − a1. Using these observations, for b1 − a1 < 2V,













￿ (V + m −a1)dm +
  a1
max{min{b1−V,a1},0}




(V −m + a1)dm +
  V +a1
max{b1−V,a1}
(V − m + a1)dm.
Since no symmetric, pure-strategy equilibrium exists in which b1 − a1 > 2V ,w ef o c u so n
b1 −a1 ≤ 2V , which we divide into the following four cases: (i) V ≤ 1
2 and b1 −a1 =2 V ; (ii)
V ≤ 1
2 and b1 − a1 ∈ (V,2V ); (iii) V ≤ 1
2 and b1 − a1 ≤ V ; and (iv) V>1
2.
(i) The only candidate for a (position-symmetric pure strategy) equilibrium in the ﬁrst
case is a1 = 1
2 − V, b1 = 1
2 + V. Given b1 = 1
2 + V according to (1) it cannot be proﬁtable
for A to decrease her position. An increase to   a1 ≤ 1
2 leads to the following utility (since
  a1 > 1
2 − V ⇒ ￿ a1+b1
2 −V>1
2 − V> 0):
UA (  a1,b 1)=( b1 −  a1)
 





  ￿ a1
￿ a1+b1
2 −V




(V − m +  a1)dm +
  V +￿ a1
b1−V
(V − m +  a1)dm,
which increases up to   a1 = 3
10 + 1
5V and decreases thereafter. Hence, increasing   a1 is not
proﬁtable if V ≤ 1
6. An increase beyond   a1 = 1
2 is not proﬁtable either; in this case,
UA (  a1,b 1)=( b1 −  a1)
 








(V + m −  a1)dm
+
  ￿ a1
b1−V
(V +m −  a1)dm +
  V +￿ a1
￿ a1
(V − m +  a1)dm,
27which decreases in   a1 for the considered region. Hence, if V ≤ 1
6,a 1 = 1
2 −V and b1 = 1
2 +V
constitute an equilibrium.
We treat the remaining cases–similarly examined by calculating the extrema of (2)–in
somewhat less detail.
(ii) If V ≤ 1
2 and 2V> b 1 − a1 >V then (2) is locally maximised with respect to a1
at a1 = 3
5b1 − 2





8 as a candidate equilibrium for V ≥ 1
6. Furthermore, a change in position is not




2 and b1 −a1 ≤ V , then (2) is maximised at a1 =2 V −b1, which cannot hold
if b1 =1− a1.
(iv) If V>1




(V + m − a1)dm +
  V +a1
a1
(V − m + a1)dm
is maximised for a1 = V . Hence, a1 = b1 = 1
2 constitutes an equilibrium. To rule out the
possibility of other permutation-symmetric equilibria when V>1
2, suppose 0 ≤ b1 −V ≤ a1.








(V + m − a1)dm +
  V +a1
a1
(V − m + a1)dm,
which implies a1 =2 V − b1. But equilibrium cannot have 0 ≤ b1 − V ≤ a1. Nor can it have




(V + m − a1)dm +2
  b1−V
a1
(V − m + a1)dm
+
  V +a1
b1−V
(V − m + a1)dm,
which occurs at a1 = 1
3b1; the only candidate equilibrium is a1 = 1
4 and b1 = 3
4, which falls
outside the considered range.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3:
We provide a formal proof for the ﬁrst statement. Since a complete proof of the second
statement involves tedious case distinctions but is straightforward and similar, we only sketch
its proof.
28If parties choose platforms a1 = b1 = 1
2 candidates will move to m ∈
 1




certainty; hence, no other platforms raise welfare for these median voters. Therefore it suﬃces





welfare is higher when a1 = b1 = 1
2 than in equilibrium.
Assume V = 1
2 − ε, ε > 0, and consider m>1
2 + V =1− ε (by symmetry, the following
arguments hold for m ∈ [0,ε)). By Proposition 4, for ε suﬃciently small, candidates stay
at 1






1−2ε and move to m with
probability 3−2m−4ε
1−2ε . In particular, we can get arbitrarily close to the optimum (i.e. to a
situation where the winning candidate takes the median voter’s position) by choosing ε small
enough.
At parties’ equilibrium positions, a1 = 1
4+ 1
4ε and b1 = 3
4− 1
4ε,w h e nm>1
2+V candidates
remain at their initial positions with probability
1
2(1−ε)














To compare welfare under these two sets of platforms, we can replace any distributions of





, which puts half its mass on m and distributes
the remainder on (−∞,m) according to Fm. Because with either set of platforms candidates
move no further than m, voter welfare does not change by replacing Fm with   Fm.B ys y m m e -
try, to analyse welfare we need only consider m ≥ 1
2.W h e nm<1−ε and both platforms are
located at 1
2, both candidates adopt the median voter’s position and welfare is zero, its highest
possible value. Hence, to show that voter welfare is higher with common platforms at one-half,
we need only show that this holds conditional on the event that m>1−ε.L e tUe(ε) be voter
welfare in equilibrium and Uc(ε) be welfare when parties locate at the centre, both conditional
on the event that m>1−ε. First consider both platforms at one-half. When m>1−ε,t h e









2 ,a n d






























































































 2    3
4 − 1
4ε − i


























d  Fm (i)

     

dm.
It is readily veriﬁed that
lim
ε→0













































 2    3
4 − 1
4ε − i


























    

d  Fm (i)dm.
If limε→0(Uc (ε) − Ue (ε)) > 0,t h e nf o rε suﬃciently small Uc (ε) >U e (ε), meaning voter
welfare would be higher with common platforms at the centre. As ε ↓ 0, Uc (ε) − Ue (ε) is
smallest when   Fm puts as much mass on 3
4 as possible, i.e. if for some positive constant k
(given by the regularity assumption)













1 if i ≥ m.













































































30Therefore limε→0 (Uc (ε) − Ue (ε)) > 0.
We now sketch the proof for small V. If V<1
6, parties choose platforms at
 1













. For m ∈
 1
2 − V, 1
2 + V
 
, candidates move to m with probability
V +m−1
2




V . We examine how welfare would change by moving platforms from
 1





2 − V − ε, 1
2 + V + ε
 
,f o rε>0.I nbo t hc a s e s ,w h e n e v e rm ∈
 
0, 1




2 + V + ε,1
 
candidates retain their platforms and are closer to the median voter for more
dispersed platforms. For regular distributions of voters’ bliss points this implies strictly higher








2 +V + ε,1
 
is always larger than losses with respect to median voters
in
 1
2 − V − ε, 1
2 + V + ε
 
.23 This is because these constituencies are “very few”, and, hence,
the latter eﬀect is only of second order for V =0and ε → 0.
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